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Recent neurological studies have found first causal evidence for a neural self-control mechanism in decision-making in 
intertemporal choice (e.g. Hare et al. 2009, 2011 & 2014, Figner et al., 2010). Figner et al. (2010) study was conducted by 
using a choice task design with binary questions between hypothetical sooner-smaller (SS) and larger-later (LL) monetary 
rewards. The researchers in that study used repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) to endogenously disrupt the 
left lateral-prefrontal cortex in individuals. They found out that the rTMS stimulation led to a decrease in self-control, which 
resulted in these individuals selecting fewer LL choices. This was especially true with the subset of choices that had 
intermediate magnitude differences (approximately between 5 and 20%). These rewards were temporally to be received 
“now”, or in 2 or 4 weeks time. In this subset the choice conflict between the SS and LL rewards was found to be the largest. 
Also, the successful triggering of self-control processes with external attention cues in intertemporal choice with binary 
dietary questions has been recently studied and proposed by Hare et al. (2011). The objective of my study is to test the 
triggering of endogenous self-control processes with exogenous attention cues in a binary choice task with 16 questions that 
are particularly designed to represent a large choice conflict between the SS and LL hypothetical monetary rewards. My 
method is to attempt to facilitate self-control by the use of a simple verbal sentence that includes functions such as cognitive 
inhibition of a prepotent response, response time, and a two-relational inverted value judgment. To my knowledge, my 
experiment is the first time that triggering of self-control with external attention cues with binary hypothetical financial delay 
discounting questions has been studied. The intervention, a simple verbal sentence, is designed within the implementation 
intention structure, an accomplished self-regulation tool from cognitive psychology that allows an effective way to 
automatize goal-directed behavior in a specified cue environment (Gollwitzer and Sheeran, 2006). The treatment sentence is 
specifically designed for the purpose of self-control facilitation in the binary choice task context but it is also intended to be 
modifiable to various general uses outside the experiment environment. The main hypothesis is that the result of the 
exogenously activated self-control intervention will enable subjects in this group to resist the temptation of the SS choice and 
thus choose more of the larger-later rewards on average than the individuals in the group who receive no intervention. The 
results of this experiment suggest that the intervention leads to subjects on average choosing significantly more LL choices in 
comparison with the control condition. Thus my conclusion is that the findings present first evidence for the utility of simple 
verbal sentences as exogenous facilitators of self-control in hypothetical financial delay discounting. Due to the simple nature 
of verbally formulated self-control tools, the cost-efficient moderation of immediate gratification has the potential to create 
enormous societal and economic benefits. 
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activation of self-control, inversion of thought, general semantics, the art of measurement. 
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"Be still my heart; thou hast known worse than this." – Homer (900 BC - 800 BC) 
In our daily lives we are repeatedly required to enter decision-making situations where 
immediate gratification leads to suboptimal results in comparison with the long-term benefits 
of temporal delay. The types of decisions that have outcomes that play out over time are 
called intertemporal choices (Berns et al., 2007). Many times these situations are also in a 
binary form, in terms of varying magnitudes and times of delivery, consisting of a short-term 
pleasurable expected outcome and a long-term beneficial expected outcome. Also, often these 
situations occur repeatedly instead of as a single choice. The immediate reward is many times 
given disproportionate weight when we make decisions in this type of contexts. For example, 
when we fail to pursue our health goals and instead fall for the pleasurable taste of an 
available chocolate treat, or when a person seeking to quit smoking fails to say no to a 
cigarette offered at a party by an attractive stranger, we are choosing the type of sooner-
smaller (SS) rewards that present suboptimal long-term outcomes. Its opposite, the larger-later 
(LL) choice, is often characterized by the required willpower to say no to a desire and persist 
in situations where it is reasonable to estimate that choosing LL will lead to more positive 
long-term effects. These types of situations are defined by the struggle between the 
alternatives of a sooner-smaller reward the impulsive choice and a larger-later reward the self-
controlled choice (Odum, 2011). The impulsive choice can also be defined as temptation, 
seduction or spend-thriftiness (Ainslie, 1974). 
Economists and psychologists define the above-described phenomenon as temporal 
discounting. There is some experimental evidence from economists for the resistance of 
temptation playing a consequential role in real-life choices (for empirical evidence, see e.g. 
Della Vigna and Malmendier, 2006, Houser et al., 2008, and Burger et al., 2009). An ongoing 
interdisciplinary work by economists, psychologists and neuroscientists attempts to 
investigate how to help people to resist the temptation of immediate gratification and thus 
reduce the large societal costs associated with loss of self-control. For example, according to 
Lopez et al., 2014, approximately 40% of deaths in the United States every year are 
attributable to self-control failures (see also Mofitt et al., 2010). A commonly proposed 
method, by economists, to increase the individual’s ability to resist a temptation is a 
commitment device. Commitment devices include tools such as choice restrictions 
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(Wertenbroch, 1998), saving plans (Asharf et al., 2006, Benartzi and Thaler, 2004), payments 
(Gine et al., 2009) or rules (Baron 2000). Taxes on addictive goods, e.g. for tobacco use, have 
also been used as self-control devices, but there is some research that questions their 
effectiveness (Fletcher and Sindelar, 2009). Recently, self-control tools studied by 
neuroscientists, such as simple verbal sentences as external attention cues, have shown 
significant effects of successful activation of neural self-control processes in decision-making 
involving dietary choices (e.g. Hare et al., 2011). In the next paragraphs I will go on to make a 
short summary of these recent neurological findings on self-control that are closely related to 
my current research, and then go on to present the theory and motivation behind my paper. 
After that I will briefly return to the economic theory behind the hyperbolic discounting 
phenomena. 
 
In a study on self-control with binary dietary choices by Hare et al. (2009) the researchers 
found out that successful and unsuccessful dieters have differences in how they weigh taste 
versus health characteristics of food choices. The unsuccessful dieters weight taste only, 
whereas the successful dieters weight both taste and health. The successful subjects were able 
to activate their neural self-control processes endogenously. In Hare et al. (2011) they 
continued to study the phenomena. The researchers used functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) to investigate the effect of exogenously activated health cues on neural self-
control processes, that are associated in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and 
inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), and value signal processes in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, 
in dietary choices between healthy and less tempting and unhealthy and more tempting foods. 
The interesting finding of that study was that the neural processes associated with self-control 
could be triggered by external verbal cues that focus the attention of the decision-maker to the 
healthiness of the food choices. This means that they could then make the participants in the 
intervention group who lacked endogenous self-control to behave like the successful dieter 
subjects in their previous (2009) study. 
The findings of Hare et al. (2014), that suggested that the neural mechanisms of successful 
self-control are similar in choice tasks concerning both dietary and hypothetical monetary 
choices, encouraged me to continue to study the use of external attention cues in a financial 
delay discounting environment. Figner et al. (2010), who presented the first causal evidence 
for activation of neural self-control processes in intertemporal choice, studied the effects of an 
intervention with binary choices and valuation tasks with varying monetary amounts and 
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times of payment. The intervention in that experiment was an internal disruption of the left 
DLPFC with a repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS), which led to a decline in 
the ability to activate endogenous self-control. Thus the subjects in the intervention group 
ended up choosing less LL choices than the comparison groups. This was found to be 
particularly true in the subset of binary decisions that represented a large choice conflict 
between the immediately available SS rewards and LL reward (for a review of other 
experimental designs, see Andersen et al., 2011). My objective is to follow the pattern of 
discovery of Hare et al. by testing if simple verbal sentences can be used to induce 
exogenously activated, and automatized, self-control with hypothetical monetary choices 
between sooner-smaller and larger-later rewards (see a fMRI study on differences of 
hypothetical versus real money gains and losses in intertemporal choice, by Bickel et al., 
2009). Further, I will attempt to use a self-regulation tool called an implementation intention 
(for a meta-analysis of implementation intentions see Gollwitzer and Sheeran 2006) as a 
structure for my intervention design, as it has been shown to exogenously induce automatized 
self-regulation in various different decision-making domains. As to my current knowledge 
this is the first time that an exogenous activation of self-control is attempted in a hypothetical 
financial delay discounting experiment, although mental self-control tools and 
implementation intentions have before been studied in relation to resistance of tempting 
stimuli (e.g. Hofmann et al., 2010),  
My main hypothesis is that the exogenous activation of self-control, by the use of a 
successfully designed verbal sentence that is presented inside an implementation intention 
structure, will result in subjects in the intervention group selecting on average more of the 
later-larger choices in comparison with the baseline group. The motivation behind my study is 
in the vision that if the public is educated about tools such as the self-control facilitating 
simple verbal sentences, that are so cost-efficient and simple to use, there will potentially be 
significant economic and societal advantages. If people who lack natural endogenous self-
control can activate it with the use of simple tools, then the economy will benefit 
tremendously as the costs associated in suboptimal decision-making due to lack of self-
control can be significantly reduced (on costs of self-control see e.g. longitudinal studies by 
Casey et al., 2011 and Mischel et al., 2011, also Tangney et al. 2004). Among these tools are 
skills such as inhibition of an impulsive response, patience, willpower and the ability to 
consider a choice from a two-relational and inverted point of view. This paper thus takes a 
perspective of normative economics. 
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Economic theories of self-control: A brief review 
	  
For an extensive critical review on time discounting and time preference, see Fredrick et al. 
(2002).  
The standard economic model, the discounted-utility (DU) model, assumes a constant rate 
exponential discounting of future rewards (Samuelson, 1937). The exponential discounting of 
future rewards means that it assumes decision-maker rationality in that the value of the reward 
is discounted at a constant rate independent of the length of delay. 
Exponential temporal discounting equation is as follows, 
V = Ae-kD 
  
Where V is the value of the delayed outcome, A is the amount of the delayed outcome, e is 
a mathematical constant, a base of the natural logarithm, D is the delay until the receival 
of the outcome and k is the discount parameter i.e. rate of discounting. 
 
The modeling of intertemporal choice with a constant discount rate assumes time consistent 
behavior. Time consistent behavior assumes that the prospect of two future rewards, a sooner-
smaller (SS) and a larger-later (LL) one, are of equal value to the decision-maker if the SS 
reward is available “now” or at some future point in time, when the LL reward is in both cases 
available after an equal delay e.g. “two days later”. For many decades now, this time 
consistency assumption of the DU model, and also its other assumptions, has been challenged 
by vast evidence from animal and human studies on intertemporal choice (see e.g., Mischel, et 
al., 1989, Hoch and Loewenstein, 1991, Ainslie, 1992, Baumeister and Vohs, 2007, Metcalfe 
and Mischel, 1999). The findings of these studies suggest that temporal discounting displays 
increasing patience with time. The subjective value of the reward is declining as the temporal 
delay between the SS and LL choices becomes bigger, i.e. the “available now” SS reward is 
being overweighed (Ainslie, 1974). Based on these findings behavioral economists and 
psychologists have built models that assume hyperbolic (Mazur, 1987) or quasi-hyperbolic 
(Laibson, 1997) discounting of subjective value. These models predict that SS rewards are on 
average overweighed, which is due to impulsivity in delay discounting decisions. Equal 
growth in delay results in bigger discounts of value during short delays than in long delays. 
Therefore the hyperbolic discounting is said to create a preference reversal over time. 
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A hyperbolic temporal discount equation is as follows (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992), 
V = A / (1 + kD) 
Where V is the value of the delayed outcome, A is the amount of the delayed outcome, e is 
a mathematical constant, a base of the natural logarithm, D is the delay until the receival 
of the outcome and k is the discount parameter i.e. rate of discounting. 
 
Strotz (1955) in his nominal paper was the first to present a model of dynamic inconsistency 
to account for the problem of intertemporal consumption utility maximization. He suggested 
that discount rates are higher in the short-run than in the long-run, meaning that people are 
patient when it comes to choices between the SS and LL reward when they are both presented 
at some future date, but when there is an opportunity for immediate gratification, then the 
behavior is often impatient. Giving an example involving bananas, if there is a choice 
between a banana at time t or two banana’s at time t+1, people would have a harder time 
choosing e.g. “two banana’s later” when the “one banana” is available “now” rather than 
when the both banana options exist at some distant time point. Strotz begins his (1955) paper 
by saying that, “Our answer is that the optimal plan of the present moment is generally one 
which will not be obeyed, or that the individual’s future behavior will be inconsistent with his 
optimal plan. If this inconsistency is not recognized, our subject will typically be a 
“spendthrift”, a term which has no meaning in existing utility theory but which becomes 
explicated in the theory presented here.” This was the criticism of the DU model that fueled 
much of the later work of economists and psychologists on time inconsistent behavior. 
In their paper, “Economic Theory of Self-Control”, Shefrin and Thaler (1978) continued on 
the work of Strotz who repeatedly mentioned the concept of self-control in connection with 
intertemporal choice, but without accounting for it in his model. Shefrin and Thaler added the 
concept of self-control to their model of dynamic inconsistency. They comment on Strotz’s 
model by saying that “The remarks seem to be based not on the model (in which it is always 
rational to do what is best given today's preferences) but rather on Strotz's value judgment that 
the high discount rates observed in the short run are inappropriate. To make the model 
complete, however, it is only necessary to have the individual share Strotz's value judgment. 
Since delay of gratification is more difficult as the object of desire draws nearer, observed 
discount rates become high in the short run. Sophisticated Individuals will recognize this 
internal, systematic bias and, like the man in the restaurant, they will rationally take steps to 
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reduce the costs of this bias. The contribution of this paper is to explicitly recognize these 
costs, and to show how they can be incorporated into an economic model of intertemporal 
choice.” The model of Shefrin and Thaler (1978) then added the dual nature of the decision-
maker by modeling the decision-maker with an analogy of an organization, consisting of a 
combination of two conflicting selves, a “planner” and a “doer”. These “sophisticated 
individuals” could then plan to behave in an unbiased way and thus avoid falling trap to the 
inconsistency that results from the “doer’s” impulsive approach. 
Later, in the (quasi-) hyperbolic model (β–δ model) of Laibson (1997) the conflict of the time 
consistent and time inconsistent discounting behavior is taken into account in his model by 
using the “beta” and “delta” parameters. In the model, the dynamically inconsistent decision-
maker is assumed to exercise an imperfect commitment technology in choosing between an 
illiquid asset z and a liquid asset x. The decision-maker may consume her liquid assets now, 
turn the illiquid assets into cash and consume in a later time-period or borrow against the 
illiquid assets and also receive the cash of the loan only at a later time-period. The discount 
function attempts to take into account the results of animal behavior experiments from e.g. 
Ainslie et al. (1992). The exponential discount function δ is of a constant function, whereas 
the β is of a hyperbolic function. The combination of these two discount functions forms the 
quasi-hyperbolic discount structure. The formulation of the quasi-hyperbolic utility function is 
as follows, 
∀𝑡,𝑈! 𝑢! ,𝑢!!,… ,𝑢! = 𝛿!𝑢! + 𝛽 𝛿!𝑢!!!!!!!  
Where 𝑢! is a person’s instantaneous utility in period t. 𝛽 <1 implies a biased preference for 
present utility. β and δ are constants between 0 and 1. 
More recently, in spirit of Shefrin and Thaler’s work, Fundenberg and Levine (2006) 
presented their model of a “dual-self” that accounts for self-control problems in time 
inconsistency. The model is based on the recent neurological findings of human fMRI studies 
that suggest that different neural processes account for short-term impulsive behavior and 
long-term planned behavior. Other recent contributions to the modeling of self-control in 
intertemporal choice include Gul & Pesendorfer (2004), Brocas and Carrillo (2014). 
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Short review of evidence of hyperbolic discounting behavior from the field 
and laboratories 
 
Study by Angeletos et al. (2000) revealed behavioral evidence on that hyperbolic households, 
which are households that hold relatively more illiquid and relatively less liquid assets use 
more credit cards and experience a greater drop in consumption around retirement. In a field 
study by Della Vigna and Malmendier (2006) the researches found out that U.S. health club 
members overestimate their future self-control or efficiency, by the less active members 
overpaying for per-visit price by committing to a payment plan instead of paying on per-visit 
basis, which results in significant excess costs over what the standard DU model would imply. 
A laboratory experiment on temptation and commitment by Houser et al (2010) used repeated 
tempting choices with the option to commit, which was possible by removing the tempting 
option. Their findings revealed a significant consistency with the Fudenberg and Levine 
(2006) hyperbolic discounting model of decisions under temptation in that if the individual 
who decides to choose to forego a tempting option she will not change the decision (i.e. not 
opt for the commitment cost) when the tempting choice is presented repeatedly. Burger et al. 
(2009) in their field experiments on willpower depletion and procrastination, which are 
problems that are strongly associated with lack of self-control, showed results that were 
consistent with all the modern behavioral models of self-control. 
Commitment devices 
	  
A commitment device could be anything from a savings plan to a promise, but in economics it 
is often modeled as a commitment contract that includes a cost when failing at self-control. 
For an overview on commitment devices, see Brocas et al. (2004). A fictitious example of a 
commitment device can be again taken from Homer’s Odyssey when Odysseus, the hero of 
the story, waxes his men’s ears and then gets himself bound to the mast of the ship in order to 
avoid falling for the sirens’ deadly temptation and states, “but you must bind me hard and 
fast, so that I cannot stir from the spot where you will stand me … and if I beg you to release 
me, you must tighten and add to my bonds.” A modern example of a commitment device 
would be cutting up one’s credit cards (Bryan et al. 2010) in order to avoid impulsive 
spending behavior, or the use of contractual commitment services like stickK 
(www.stickk.com) or pre-commitment applications like  
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SelfControl (www.selfcontrolapp.com) that aim at avoiding the entering of distractive 
websites. 
Differences in delay discounting experiments with hypothetical and real 
rewards 
	  
There are a number of studies on the differences of hypothetical and real rewards in delay 
discounting experiments. According to Frederick et al. (2002) overwhelming majority of these 
studies conclude that hypothetical rewards are a valid proxy for delay discounting with real 
rewards. The benefit of using hypothetical rewards over real ones is in that they allow the use 
of large monetary choice sums that make the results of the experiments applicable for 
understanding real-life delay discounting behavior. For example, a within-subjects design 
analysis by Madden et al. (2002), Johnson & Bickel (2002), Bickel et al. (2009) on delay 
discounting, and on social discounting by Locey et al. (2011) found no significant differences 
in how real and hypothetical rewards are discounted. 
The relation with impulsivity in hypothetical financial delay discounting 
and real-world impulsive behavior 
	  
Reimers et al. (2007 & 2009) in their study on temporal choice with a large sample (around 
48,000 UK-resident participants) found an association with measures of early sexual activity, 
infidelity, smoking, drug use, above normal (and below normal, to some extend) body-mass-
index (BMI) and increased preference for the hypothetical sooner-smaller (impulsive) reward. 
Also demographics such as younger age, lower income, lower education and female gender 
were associated with a preference for the SS reward. This study provided evidence for 
financial discounting being associated with real-world impulsivity, implying that economic 
decision-making partially correlates with impulsivity in other domains of life. Research by 
Tangney, Baumeister and Boone (2004) found correlations between high self-control scores 
and high grade point average, self-esteem, less alcohol abuse, less impulsive eating, better 
relationships and interpersonal skills, more optimal emotional responses and fewer 
psychopathology reports. These studies provide a scratch at the surface of the topic of how 
self-control is an important characteristic in relation to quality of life. 
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Nurture: Cultural differences in delay discounting 
	  
Study by Takahashi et al. (2009) confirmed the predictions of cultural neuroeconomic theory, 
which states that Westerners have an analytical cognitive style of allocating their attention in 
intertemporal choice decisions and that that is different from Easterners who approach similar 
decisions holistically. The result is that Westerners are more impulsive and inconsistent in 
intertemporal choice in comparison to Easterners. These cultural differences suggest that 
nurture, and most importantly the way people allocate their attention, plays a significant role 
in how people make decisions in intertemporal choice. It would logically follow that learning 
then can influence people how they approach intertemporal choice decisions. The findings of 
Takahashi et al. (2009) are therefore encouraging for this study of exogenous interventions 
that seek to increase the role that nurture plays in delay discounting behavior. 
Nature: Role of disposition in delay discounting 
	  
Although nurture plays a significant role in intertemporal choice, individuals also are by 
nature very different in how they discount future rewards (Shamosh et al., 2008). 
Interestingly, in their study Shamosh et al. (2008) found a negative relation between delay 
discounting and intelligence. According to Gianotti et al. (2012) some of these differences in 
delay discounting are due to genetic factors. Also, Anokhin et al. (2011) research on twins 
provides evidence for heritability of delay discounting in humans. Boettiger et al. (2007) in 
their study “Immediate reward bias in humans” found significant genotype effects of variation 
in dopamine metabolism on temporal discounting behavior. These studies suggest that 
disposition, or “nature”, is of major influence in delay discounting decision-making. Due to 
dispositional factors some people have more difficulties in activating the self-control 
processes endogenously than others. This is the group of people that would benefit the most 
of the use of self-control tools. 
Currently known neural processes associated with intertemporal choice 
 
Intertemporal choice behavior is connected to specific neural processes. Two systems that 
have for some time been speculated to be relevant in intertemporal choice decisions are the 
intuitive system, that values primarily or only SS rewards, and the reflective system, that 
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values both SS and LL rewards. The qausi-hyperbolic model (β–δ model) represents this 
theory of two separate neural processes. According to McClure et al. (2004a, 2007) the neural 
processes behind the intuitive system (β -system) are correlated with activity in ventral 
striatum, ventromedial prefrontral cortex (VMPFC) and posterior cingulate cortex. The neural 
processes behind the reflective system (δ -system) were found to correlate with activity in 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and posterior parietal cortex. This separation is also 
known by the name of dual-process theory (Evans & Stanovich, 2014). Recent findings 
provide first causal evidence that in addition to these separated neural processes associated in 
decision-making in intertemporal choice there may also be a neural self-control account that is 
responsible for subjective valuation of choices (Figner et al., 2010, Hare et al. 2009, 2011 & 
2014, Kuhn et al. 2014). 
Implementation intentions 
	  
Professors Peter Gollwitzer, Thomas Webb, Gabriele Oettingen and Paschal Sheeran have 
been the central researchers in designing and extensively studying the use of simple verbal 
sentences that aim at increasing self-regulation in individuals in various different contexts of 
goal attainment processes. These simple verbal sentences are called implementation 
intentions. “Implementation intentions are if-then plans that spell out in advance how one 
wants to strive for a set goal. For the if-component, a critical cue is selected (e.g., a good 
opportunity, an anticipated obstacle) that is linked to a goal-directed response in the then-
component. Implementation intentions are known to enhance the rate of goal attainment. They 
do so by delegating action control to situational cues thus endowing action control with 
features of automaticity.” quoted directly from (Gollwitzer & Oettingen, 2013). For an 
informative paper about the different functions of implementation intentions, see “How to 
Maximize Implementation Intention Effects” by Gollwitzer et al. (2010). Most interestingly 
for my experiment, implementation intentions have been studied in the context of delay of 
gratification in children with and without ADHD (Gollwitzer et al., 2011). The results of that 
study suggest that delay of gratification can be increased with the use of implementation 
intentions.  
Implementation intentions have specially designed structure that separates it from base goals. 
“While goal intentions (goals) have the structure “I intend to reach Z!” with Z relating to a 
desired future behavior or outcome, implementation intentions have the structure “If situation 
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X is encountered, then I will perform the goal-directed response Y!” Thus, implementation 
intentions define when, where, and how one wants to act on one’s goal intentions. In order to 
form an implementation intention, individuals need to identify a goal-relevant situational cue 
(such as a good opportunity to act, or an obstacle goal striving) and link it to an instrumental 
goal-directed response. Goal intentions merely specify a desired future behavior or outcome. 
On the contrary, the if-component of an implementation intention specifies when and where 
one wants to act on this goal, and the then-component of the implementation intention 
specifies how this will be done. For instance, a person with the goal to reduce alcohol 
consumption might from the following implementation intention: “And whenever a waiter 
suggests ordering a second drink, then I’ll ask for mineral water!” Empirical data supports the 
assumption that implementation intentions help close the gap between holding goals and 
attaining them. A meta-analysis based on close to a hundred studies shows a medium to large 
effect on increased rate of goal attainment.” quoted directly from (Gollwitzer and Sheeran, 
2006). The brilliance of implementation intentions lies in its simplicity of use, cost-efficiency 
and the automatic activation of the goal-directed behavior, which requires no conscious 
exertion of attention when the cue situation occurs. This saves the individual from the 
depletion of the precious willpower resource, which is specifically important for enabling 
successful self-control (Wagner et al, 2013 and Kuhn et al., 2014). 
Attention 
	  
Recent neuroimaging studies have identified attention to be divisible into three different 
functions that have their individual neurotransmitter modulators and which are also 
identifiable in separate neural activity processing. The three different functions are orienting, 
alerting, and executive attention (Posner and Rothbart, 2007). The role of executive attention 
is relevant in connection to my experiment, since it involves mechanisms for the monitoring 
and resolving of conflict among cognition, affect and responses. The objective of my 
intervention is to stimulate the executive attention networks by exogenously steering the 
attention to a cue specific goal-directed response, which involves a facilitation of the 
individual’s self-control processes. This objective of forming an attention cue that seeks to 
induce endogenous self-control is somewhat similar to that of the Hare et al. (2011) study. 
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Query theory and reversal of the value judgment 
	  
Johnson, Keinan and Häubl in their paper Aspects of Endowment: A Query Theory of Value 
Construction (2007) suggested that the order of the perception of values, or query, is 
influenced by the way the decision-maker focuses her attention to the choice. One (fourth) of 
the premises of the query theory is that the decision-makers approach the choice valuation in 
differing ways that are activated according to their position, e.g. if the decision-maker is a 
seller or a buyer in considering a transaction. A chooser (in the case of a transaction decision 
in an endowment effect experiment) usually makes her judgment from the perspective of first 
considering why to not enter into the transaction and then secondly why to enter one, whereas 
the opposite seems to hold true for the sellers. The theory sheds light to the intuition that 
when people approach decisions with different orders of query this leads to differences in 
value construction. The results of Johnson, Keinan and Häubl’s experiment showed that by 
reversing the order of the query to an unnatural sequential perception pattern, by making 
sellers list value-decreasing aspects of the endowment first and choosers to list value-
enhancing aspects first, the endowment effect was eliminated completely. According to 
Kahneman and Miller (1986) decision makers usually make the value judgment from the 
perspective of “what are the advantages of the status quo?” first and then only after evaluate 
the advantages of the opposite perspective. These findings would in theory lead to differences 
in situations where people are asked for “what they would prefer”, contra being asked to 
consider first “what they would not prefer”, and where they still are required to “choose 
according to their preferences”. Koriat, Lichtenstein and Fischoff (1980) found effects similar 
to Johnson, Keinan and Häubl in relation to reversal of order in asking the subject if she is 
wrong, rather than if they are right. This reversal was found to reduce overconfidence effects. 
Cognitive re-construal, pre-commitment, motivation and willpower 
	  
Cognitive re-construal is the cognitive reconstruction or visualization of one’s goal intention 
into a task that seeks to activate a higher motivation in the individual’s goal attainment 
pursuit. Magen and Gross (2007) found out that cognitive re-construal is beneficial in 
resisting temptation of the immediate reward in a hand-grip task. The goal in this task was to 
hold-on to the hand-grip device as long as possible, which required that the participant 
resisted the temptation of stopping due to the painful nature of the task. In their study, 
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participants in the treatment group who construed the task as a test of willpower were able to 
resist temptation better than the group that did not receive the cognitive re-construal 
intervention. Cognitive re-construal focuses the individual’s attention to an ex ante specified 
goal intention, which makes the exercise of willpower easier. According to e.g. Baumeister, 
Vohs and Tice (2007), willpower is an important component in self-regulatory processes. 
Willpower to exert self-control is a limited energy resource and can be depleted, almost like a 
muscle that gets tired, when used. Being repeatedly exposed to a tempting object will result in 
depletion of willpower and increased difficulty to resist it. Also low blood glucose levels have 
shown to have negative effects on willpower. Implementation intentions are among the 
suggested tools to reduce the depletion of that valuable resource. In addition to willpower, 
Baumeister and Vohs (2007) suggest that motivation also plays a significant role in using self-
regulation to achieve a goal or meet a standard. Its role is two-folded though, as motivation 
can either create a conflict between selfish and social motives or be a benefit for effective 
self-regulation. In relation to willpower, pre-commitment has been recently studied as an 
effective tool for activating neural self-control processes that lead to a successful resistance of 
the tempting SS choice (Crockett et al., 2013). 
2. Materials and methods 
 
Subjects 
108 Swedish students, men and women (50,9% and 49,1% respectively), between the ages of 
19 to 29 years from Gothenburg University School of Business, Economics and Law 
participated anonymously to this non-incentivized experiment. 
 
Materials 
The participants took part to the study by receiving a link to the experiment that was 
conducted by using the SurveyMonkey.com online survey service (Gold plan). The 
participants were contacted by university email and were asked to take part in an experiment 
on economic decision-making that takes on average eight minutes to complete. The 
participants answered to the experiment at the university computers or at home on their 
personal computers. 
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Procedure 
The computerized session started when the participant entered the link in their browser.  A 
pseudo-random algorithm included in the service divided the participants equally into two 
groups with 54 participants in each condition. The other group received no intervention, but 
only a control question to check if they understood the instruction message, and the other 
group received an exogenous self-control intervention. 
Intervention condition experiment timeline: 
 
 
No-intervention condition experiment timeline: 
 
After receiving the welcome page message titled “Economic Decision-Making Task” the 
participants all were given the same instruction message. The first paragraph of the instruction 
message was formulated by following the example of Murphy et al. (2001) instruction 
message. The instruction message of my experiment was as follows: 
”Please read the following instruction message carefully: 
 
The options are about money you will receive either immediately or later. Suppose as if the 
options were about real money. Two amounts of money appear on the monitor. A decision 
takes place when you check a box under the amount you prefer and then press the “Next” 
button on the screen. Your job is to choose which of the two amounts of money is most 
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individual basis. Just judge each amount based on what is most appealing to you. Remember 
that there are no 'right' or 'wrong' answers in this task. 
On the next page you will receive a practice question. After that you get a short message and 
then answer the 16 questions. Please answer the experiment alone, in one sitting and focus on 
it. Also, put away any media that would hinder your attention to the task.” 
The Murphy et al. (2011) instruction message was chosen as an example, because it provided 
a clear and applicable standard that was used in a similar choice task design. After the 
instruction message all the participants received an example question (see appendix page 42 
for a screenshot) that was intended as a visualization device so that the intervention condition 
would have an easier time to mentally simulate the situational cue and then link it to the 
intended goal-directed behavior in the choice task. 
On the next page the participants received either the baseline condition or the treatment 
condition stating, “Past research has shown that people approach tasks with different goals, 
which are important in determining their outcomes. That said, I would like you to memorize a 
goal for this task. Following the goal is important in that it will help you to ensure a quality 
decision-making process. In order to help you memorize the goal, I would like you to read the 
sentence below with full attention and then say it out loud to yourself three (3) times:  
'IF I AM ASKED WHAT I WOULD PREFER, THEN I WILL IGNORE MY IMPULSIVE 
OPINION AND TAKE TIME TO MEASURE WHICH ONE IS THE WORSE CHOICE ... AND 
THEN SELECT THE OTHER ONE!' 
 After you are done with the memorization, please write the sentence down (in lower case 
letters/small letters) to the box below:” The baseline condition involved a control question 
about the first page task instructions that they were then asked to answer into a text box: 
“In order to check that you have understood the instructions on the first page, please state 
what is your purpose in this choice task by writing it down in a single sentence to the text box 
below:” 
The choice task with the 16 binary questions was then started (see appendix page 42 for a 
screenshot). After the first eight binary questions the participants were asked to re-state the 
sentence that they wrote down at the time when they either received the intervention or the 
no-intervention message: 
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“Great! We have now come halfway to the task. I would like you to try hard to remember 
what you wrote down into the box at the beginning of this experiment. Please try to remember 
the sentence by writing it to the box below:”  
The re-stating of the sentence was then followed by the remaining eight binary choice task 
questions. After the choice task was completed, the experiment continued with the Adult 
ADHD Self-Report Scale (ASRS-V1.1) Symptom Checklist Part A, which consists of six 
questions and is intended to provide clues about potential adult age ADHD symptoms (see the 
appendix for the whole questionnaire and its interpretation). If the subject answers 4 or more 
questions above a highlighted scale, then the result suggests a potential case of adult age 
ADHD (see the questionnaire and instructions about its interpretations in the appendix). 
The last part of the experiment was a Socio-Economic Status (SES) survey including 
questions about gender, effect of 200-1000 SEK on monthly budget and self-reported average 
response time per choice task question (screenshot in appendix pg. 43). The experiment then 
ended with a “thank you” message. The survey tool collected the IP addresses of participants, 
date and time of completion and total experiment completion times. Also the non-completed 




I have designed a novel intertemporal choice task where participants in both groups answered 
16 binary choices that offered a sooner-smaller (SS) and a larger-later (LL) reward with 
magnitude differences that aimed at producing a large choice conflict. The reasoning behind 
having multiple choices is that this better represents the nature of SS choices in real-life, since 
they are often in a repeated form, instead of a single choice form (Houser et al. 2010). The 
reward magnitude differences were chosen as a result of the findings in Figner et al. (2010) 
where they discovered that intermediate magnitude differences present the largest choice 
conflict and thus demand the most self-control in resisting the pleasure of the immediately 
available SS. This would imply a relatively even distribution between the SS and LL choices 
among the no-intervention group of subjects. In addition to the differences in reward 
magnitudes between SS and LL, the LL reward was stated to be received either 2 or 4 weeks 
later than the SS reward that was always stated to be received now (the time of receiving LL 
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follows the form of a continuous sequence of “in 2, 4, 2, …, 4 weeks”). The “now-or-later” 
design is in line with the findings of Figner et al. (2010), where they found that the self-
control is needed when the tempting SS choice is available now, rather than at some future 
time (i.e. where SS was being received in “2 weeks” or “4 weeks” instead of “now”). The 
order of appearance of the rewards on the screen, either the SS or the LL choice presented on 
the left, was randomly flipped throughout the experiment. Reward magnitudes of SS were 
chosen by using the randomizer.org random number generator. The rewards were presented in 
Swedish currency (SEK) and were between amounts of 200 and 1000 SEK. The LL rewards 
differed from SS by an incrementally increasing factor until the mid-point of the task and then 
starting again after the mid-point from low magnitude difference to a larger (LL was larger 
than SS by 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, and 18%). The incrementally increasing monetary amounts 
represent an increasing difficulty to resist temptation until the mid-point, where the same 
process is restarted (naturally with different randomly chosen monetary amounts). Also, at the 
mid-point, the participants in the intervention condition were asked to re-state the goal 
intention sentence. The no-intervention group participants re-stated the control question 
answer. This question was done to check if the individuals had followed the instructions. 
In the paragraph below (Graph 1) I have illustrated the relationship between the discount rate, 
on the vertical axis, and question order, on horizontal axis. 
Graph 1 
By observing the graph one can see how the discount rates fluctuate throughout the task 
design. The discount rates begin from 4% (question 1) and go up to 18% at mid-point 
(question 8), with 2 percentage point increases, and then again repeat the same pattern from 
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question 9 through 16. The time of payment for the LL choice differs for the discount rates by 
a continuous pattern of “in 2 weeks (question 1), in 4 weeks (question 2), …, in 4 weeks 
(question 16)”. The questions with the same discount rate in the second half of the choice task 
have different times of payment. For example, the question 1 has a 4% discount for the LL 
choice and a 2 week payment date and its pair in the second half of the choice task, the 
question 9, which also has a 4% discount rate but a 4 week payment date. 
Hypothesis 1: The choice task design will on average present a large choice conflict between 
the SS and LL choices for the individuals in the no-intervention group, i.e. implying a close-
to-even (close to 50-50 split) choice distribution. 
Intervention design 
	  
With the use of general semantics, my intervention will attempt to help the individual to 
discover the choice that is most rational to her. I further speculate that the decision-maker 
who receives my intervention will be able to, on average, be more rational if she ignores the 
impulsive opinion, takes time to think (measure) and approaches the choice from a two-
relational, instead of a single-relational, inverted perspective. Later in this paper I will refer to 
the intervention design by the name of the Art of Measurement (AoM) -device. 
Table 1. Description of the AoM –device functions 
List of AoM –device functions Aimed purpose of the function 
Implementation intention sentence structure Automatized goal-directed behavior in a 
situational cue environment 
Inhibition of a prepotent response Behavioral inhibition by blocking an 
impulsive decision 
Response time Patience to take time to measure/reflect 
Two-relational inverted value judgment Activation of executive cognitive functions 
and self-control processes 
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An ancient example of a self-control activating verbal sentence can be observed in the ancient 
Greek poet Homer’s quote from approx. 800 BC, “Be still my heart; thou hast known worse 
than this.", where the aforementioned person repeats a verbal sentence aloud that seeks to 
remind himself about past difficulties in order for him to overcome the present one. The quote 
is a relevant example to the intervention of this study, because there is a link to ancient 
Greece in the way the rhetorical functions of the AoM -device are designed. Further, the 
intervention is formatted inside an implementation intention structure that consists of if- and 
then- sentence components (Gollwitzer and Sheeran, 2006). 
The exogenous activation of self-control will be attempted with the following simple verbal 
sentence. 
The AoM –device: 
“If I am asked what I would prefer, then I will ignore my impulsive opinion and take time to 
measure which one is the worse choice, … and then select the other one!” 
The sentence consists of a situational cue, the if-component of an implementation intention 
structure, and after the first comma, a goal-directed response, the then-component of an 
implementation intention structure. The then-component consists of three different functions. 
The ideas behind the components and functions are described in the paragraphs below. The 
part of the intervention sentence that is explained in the next paragraph is highlighted by the 
bolded format. 
The situational cue 
“If I am asked what I would prefer, then I will ignore my impulsive opinion and take time to 
measure which one is the worse choice, … and then select the other one!” 
The if-component of an implementation intention structure forms a cue to an ex ante specified 
environment. The wording that is highlighted above is mentally linked to the individual 
choice task screen where the question, “What would you prefer?” is stated. The situational 
cue is then activated when the participant reads the literal question on the screen. The 
situational cue could also be modified to various other types of situations, e.g. “If I am being 
asked that do I want to have a smoke…” The flexibility behind the implementation intention 
structure allows that this cue can also be a physical or mental environment or an emotional 
state (Gollwitzer et al. 2007). 
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Rhetorical functions behind the AoM –device 
The exogenous activation of the neural self-control process in the simple verbal sentence 
format contains three functions that are installed in the then-component of the implementation 
intention structure. The then-component aims at automatized goal-directed actions. The 
functions are 1. inhibition of a prepotent response, 2. response time and 3. A two-relational 
inverted value judgment. These three functions aim at specific cognitive effects in the 
individual receiving the intervention and memorizing it. 
Function one: Inhibition of a prepotent response 
“If I am asked what I would prefer, then I will ignore my impulsive opinion and take time to 
measure which one is the worse choice, … and then select the other one!” 
Behavioral inhibition is a key component in the successful resistance of repeated temptation 
(Polivy, 1998). Inhibition of a prepotent (impulsive) response has been found to be beneficial 
in decision-making where executive neural processes are required for better performance in a 
task (Li et al., 2006b, Diamond et al., 2002). When the temptation of acting impulsively and 
choosing the SS is large, the inhibition will be particularly important. Requiring the decision-
maker not to act impulsively will be used in the intervention since the neural processes behind 
impulsive decision-making account for overweighing of the SS reward. In attempt to 
overcome this I have included an inhibition of a prepotent response, a behavioral inhibition, 
as the first function of the intervention. This function attempts to block the subject’s 
impulsive response and therefore allow for the operation of executive cognitive functions. The 
executive cognitive functions are planned as separate goals in the following stages of the 
then-component.  
Function two: response time 
“If I am asked what I would prefer, then I will ignore my impulsive opinion and take time to 
measure which one is the worse choice, … and then select the other one!” 
There are an increasing number studies about response time (RT) in economic decision-
making (Chabris et al., 2008, Rand, Greene & Nowak 2012, Schotter & Trevino 2010, 
Ratcliff & Rouder 2009, and Rubinstein 2013 to name a few). This literature focuses mainly 
on documenting response times for correct and incorrect choices in different type of decision-
making tasks. To shortly summarize the findings in these studies is that faster response time 
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indicates more instinctive or intuitive cognitive processes and the slower response time are 
correlated with more reflective and rational thinking. This interpretation often links this 
literature to the dual-system process perspective as suggested by e.g. Frederick and 
Kahneman (2005). Research by Habris et al. (2008) is also of relevance, since it studied RT in 
intertemporal choice in a binary choice set similar to the one used in this experiment. They 
conclude by saying that, “…Response time data sheds light on both our preferences and on 
the cognitive processes that execute those preferences.” Recent neuroimaging studies have 
also found a relation between response time and valuation of monetary rewards in short-term 
temporal discounting (Gregorios-Pippas et al., 2009). As the temporal delay of the reward 
increased, already during a short delay of 4-13.5 seconds, the subjective reward valuation was 
decreased. The AoM –device takes RT into account by attempting to allow some time for the 
activation of reflective neural processes, which intends to make the responder more patient in 
her decision-making. 
Function three: A two-relational inverted value judgment 
“If I am asked what I would prefer, then I will ignore my impulsive opinion and take time to 
measure which one is the worse choice, … and then select the other one!” 
Introverted parallelism of thought is a rhetorical concept that is common in many historically 
known works of western literature. One of the most known users of this concept was the 
Greek poet Homer (Samuel Eliot Bassett, The Poetry of Homer, Volume 15, pg. 126). Also, 
the philosopher Socrates used this rhetorical device, the “Homeric hysteron proteron” The 
inversion of words and ideas was many times present in his dialogues that Plato documented 
into literate form. Similar transpositions are also found in the narratives of William 
Shakespeare. They are utilized even in popular culture by the imaginary figure Yoda of the 
Star Wars saga. The reversion of words in a sentence is an attempt of making the reader to 
exert more attention to the idea behind the sentence. The unnatural order of words causes 
confusion in the individual, which I then speculate to stimulate additional attention. 
“This was what I meant when I spoke of impressions which invited the intellect, or the 
reverse, those which are simultaneous with opposite impressions, invite thought; those which 
are simultaneous do not.” Socrates in Plato’s The Republic. 
The goal-directed behavior of an inverse value judgment attempts to implement this above-
mentioned rhetorical device. Instead of an idea of a preferred choice as a 1-relational or 
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singular option, now there is a division into two parallel options: the worse and its opposite. 
The division thus involves the concept of plurality in the form of two contradicting values. 
This parallelism is then presented in an inverted, and therefore unnatural, fashion attracting 
the attention to the worse choice first and measuring it against its opposite. This type of 
introverted parallelism of thought is an idea that was inspired by the theory of logic 
(Jacquette, 2002). In relation to the Johnson, Keinan and Häubl (2007) findings on the 
reversal of the natural order of query in an endowment transaction, the third function of the 
AoM -device seeks to influence the decision-maker by considering the value judgment in an 
unnatural way. I speculate that the subject is making a more impulsive decision when she is 
asked “what would you prefer?”, and then choosing according to her preferences, than when 
she is considering the decision first from the perspective of “which is the worse choice?”, 
given the same question. The unnatural sequence pattern of the value judgment would thus 
result in the subject receiving the manipulation condition being on average more reflective 
rather than impulsive.	  	  
What Socrates called by the name of “the art of measurement” is a careful observation about 
the relative values in binary choices. The word ‘measure’ is then used in the sentence in order 
to direct the additional attention to a thoughtful examination of the question, which I speculate 
to lead to an increase in executive control processes.  
In terms of logic, the undivided and natural approach to the value judgment would be 
presented in a following way: 
“…choose the best choice!” 
A divided and natural value judgment would be as follows:  
”…measure and compare the two choices, … and then select the better one!” 
Whereas the inverse order of the divided value judgment, in an unnatural or inverted form, is 
presented as:   
”….measure which one is the worst choice, … and then select the other one!” 
Neuroimaging studies have found evidence for relational integration, or the simultaneous 
consideration of multiple relations, to require complex reasoning that is associated with 
prefrontal cortex activity (Christoff et al. 2001). A 2-relational reasoning includes two 
dimensions being considered simultaneously, i.e. they are integrated, whereas a 0-relational 
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and 1-relational reasoning does not. 2-relational reasoning is then more complex and requires 
additional executive control, which was in the Christoff et al. (2001) study measured as an 
increase in prefrontal cortex activity. My speculation is that the additional executive control in 
theory then allows for the opportunity to activate endogenous self-control processes. As the 
following quote suggests, Socrates was also aware of the rhetorical power behind a relational 
integration process. 
“…when there is some contradiction always present, and one is the reverse of one and 
involves the conception of plurality, then thought begins to be aroused within us…” (Socrates 
in Plato’s The Republic). 
The interplay of these three functions in a verbal sentence form, within the implementation 
intention structure, is hypothesized to exogenously induce automatized self-control in 
individuals who are lacking natural endogenous self-control. Implementation of the AoM is 
materially cost-free and only requires the individual to believe in its effects and then exert 
attention for a brief time to verbally or literally (or both) formulate it. This happens by 
planning its specified cue, i.e. the if-component of the implementation intention structure and 
then memorizing the sentence, preferably by writing it down with a pen and a paper and then 
stating it out loud to oneself. 
Hypothesis 2: The intervention group will on average choose significantly more LL rewards 
than the no-intervention group, due to the memorized AOM-device (an exogenous activation 
of self-control), which is speculated to be a result of an increased ability to resist the 
temptation of the SS choice. 
3. Data and analysis 
	  
The behavioral data of the 108 participants was analyzed by using between-groups t-test and a 
One-Way ANOVA. The dependent variable was the mean fraction of LL choices out of the 
total of 16 binary choices. The independent variable was the intervention (x=1) or no-
intervention (x=0) subject group condition. We also analyzed the effects of the self-reported 
response time, answers to the World Health Organization’s Adult ADHD Self-Report Scale 
(ASRS-V1.1) Symptom Checklist Part A. Answers to socio-economic status (SES) questions 
were also analyzed. 
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 Correlation. A correlational study between the two groups revealed a significant (p=.017, 
Sig. 2-tailed) correlation between the mean fractions of LLs out of the total 16 choices (corr.= 
.229). Randomization. The One-Way ANOVA analysis of the other variables showed that 
there was no between-group differences in gender (F=.036, p=.849), ASRS-V1.1 answers 
(F=1.96, p=.164) or impact on budget (F=.015, p=.901). There was a significant differences in 
self-reported response times at the 5% level (F=4,295, p=.041) though. This implies that the 
subjects in the intervention condition reported that they took more time on average to answer 
to each choice task question. This is perhaps because they could have been following the 
function two (response time) of the AoM –device or otherwise been more patient and/or 
reflective in making their choices. Mean total completion time of the experiment also revealed 
to be significantly different at the 10% level (F=3.351, p=.070). Mean total completion time 
for the intervention group was 9 minutes and 9 seconds, whereas it was 7 minutes and 59 
seconds for the control group, and 8 minutes and 34 seconds for the total sample. The found 
difference is logical, since in addition to the observed longer time per choice task question the 
intervention sentence took more time to implement than the control condition. Gender 
differences. I also conducted a One-Way ANOVA between-groups analysis separately for 
both genders, which showed a significant effect for male-only group (F=4.743, p=.034) and a 
non-significant effect for the women-only group (F=2.269, p=.138) implying that the males 
were more effected by the treatment.  
Demographics. Although there were positive coefficients in gender and budget impact, the 
control variables that consisted of the SES questions proved to be of no statistical significance 
on predicting subjects’ mean fraction of LLs at the 5% or 10% levels. There is a variety of 
studies that have proven associations between lower discounting and some SES questions 
though, such as education and smoking (Jaroni et al., 2004), income (Harrison et al., 2002) 
and age (e.g. Green et al., 1996, Whelan and McHugh, 2009). Descriptive statistics. Budget 
impact: 7.4% of the total sample reported to have no impact at all of the 200-1000 SEK sum 
on their monthly budget, 28.7% reported a small impact, 52.8% some impact and 11.1% a 
large impact. ASRS-V1.1 answers: 20 participants or 18.5% had 0 hits, 18.5% 1 hit, 30 or 
27.8% 2 hits, 21 or 19.4% 3 hits, 14 or 13.0% 4 hits (the ADHD threshold) and 3 or 2.8% had 
5 hits. This would suggest that 15.7% of the participants (17 out of 108) could be suffering 
from adult age ADHD symptoms. Self-reported response time (RT): 55.6% of the participants 
took less than 3 seconds to answer each choice task question on average, 43.5% took 3-13 
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seconds and 0.9% more than 13 seconds. These RT findings then imply that slight majority of 
participants made quick intuitive decisions.  
Homogeneity. I conducted a Fligner-Killeen test of homogeneity of variances. The results are 
presented in the table below. 
Fligner-Killeen test of 
homogeneity of 
variances 
Between females in 
control group and 
females in treatment 
group 
Between males in 
control group and 
males in treatment 
group 
Between control group 
and treatment group 
Between males and 
females 
Chi-squared 12.12 12.94 21.30 10.76 
Df 9 10 14 14 
p-value 0.21 0.23 0.09 0.70 
 
The results imply that the variances in the each group are the same and thus the variance 
between the groups is homogenous, except in the case of the control group and treatment 
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Subjects in the no-intervention group selected 55.6% LLs on average, indicating a large 
choice conflict between the SS and LL choices, which I interpret as a confirming result to my 
first hypothesis. Subjects in the intervention condition selected an average of 70.4% LLs, 
which was a significantly larger proportion compared with the control group, which responds 
to a 14.8 percentage unit difference in the means. This confirms my second hypothesis. It 
could be speculated that since the subjects were business and economics students, the 
proportion of LL choices in the control condition (55.6%) was slightly higher than what could 
be expected from a sample more representative of the general population, i.e. where the result 
could be an closer to even (50-50 split) choice distribution as I predicted in my first 
hypothesis. The standard deviation in both groups was observed to be high (STD x=0, .316 
and STD x=1, .319). This is likely due to the major individual differences in how individuals 
discount future values in this type of a binary choice environment. The R squared was 
observed to be very low (R squared=.052). This is also quite likely because of the large 
between-subjects variation. 
Table 3. 
p value, Sig. 2-tailed t-value F-value b - coefficient 
.017 -2.423 5.869 -.148 
 
The One-Way ANOVA (see appendix pg. 47) and the between-groups univariate analysis 
revealed that the effect of the intervention was statistically and economically significant at the 
5% level (p=.017, Sig. 2-tailed, t=-2.423, F=5.869 and b=-.148). These results confirm my 
second hypothesis that states that an exogenous activation of self-control in the form of a 
simple verbal sentence, inside an implementation intention structure, leads to participants in 
the intervention group to select on average more LL choices relative to the no-intervention 
group. The analysis predicts that the individuals in the intervention group selected on average 
14.8% more LLs than in the no-intervention group.  
The figure (Figure 1.) below illustrates the comparison of distributions between the 
intervention (x=1) and no-intervention (x=0) groups in terms of the subject’s relative 
proportions of LLs chosen out of the total 16 questions. 
 




An observation of the figure reveals that the largest difference was in more individuals in the 
intervention group selecting 16/16 LLs. Interestingly this was also true of the individuals who 
selected 0/16 LLs, which presented proportionally a much larger number of subjects in the 
intervention group. 
Overall, it is evident that there is a variety of ways how individuals approach the choice task. 
A choice task design pre-test follow-up discussion, that only included the no-intervention 
condition, with a select number of participants revealed some insights about these differences. 
Some subjects (reflective) think in terms of the discount rate by comparing it to what they can 
receive elsewhere. If the discount rate justifies the delay, they will wait, if not, then they will 
take the SS. These subjects tend to choose significantly more of the LL choices. Some 
subjects (heuristic) use rules of thumb such as “how many more beers can I buy with the 
spread between the SS and LL?” Here again the LL choices are weighted proportionally more 
than the SSs, but less than in the reflective sub-group. Some subjects (shoppers) think in 
terms of their budget, i.e. if they need money they always take the SS and if they are in no 
need of the sum at the moment, they always take the LL. Many of these subjects then have 
selected either 0% or 100% LLs out of total choices. The follow-up discussions also suggest 
that the individuals in the reflective sub-group, who take time to measure between the SS and 
LL, are self-educated about their approach to questions of this nature. The ability to be patient 
about the decision and in using careful measuring of the choices will in theory activate the 
executive neural processes and thus also quite likely result in activation of endogenous self-
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control. On the other hand, individuals who act more or entirely according to their intuition 
have more between-subjects variation in their choices between the SS and LL. Their quick 
opinion leads them to a choice, which is dependent on their situational needs and dispositional 
factors, contra reasoning. The AoM -intervention attempted to induce similar behavior as was 
characterized by the reflective sub-group decision-makers. The results suggest that the 
attempt was successful. 
In the following paragraphs I have made a short qualitative analysis of the results of the 
choice-task behavior of individuals in the treatment (Graph 3) and control (Graph 2) groups. 
The graph below (Graph 2) represents the fraction of people in the control group who chose 
the LL in each question. 
Graph 2 
 
As we can see from the graph, the individuals in the control group had much more volatility 
between 2-week payment date and 4-week payment date choices during the second half of the 
choice task than during the first half. This could imply increasing impatience after the mid-
point of the choice task to wait for the 4 weeks compared with 2-week payment dates. The 
low points of the naturally graph represent 4-week payment dates and the high points 2-week 
payment dates. It could be that people have decreasing willpower to resist the temptation of 
the SS choice with repeated choices. The questions in this choice task require constant 
attention because of the changing time dimensions and discount rates. 
The graph below (Graph 3) represents the fraction of individuals making LL choices per 
question in the treatment group. 




Participants in the intervention condition followed almost an identical behavioral pattern as in 
the control condition, based on the volatility of choices across different time dimensions when 
comparing the first and second half’s of the choice task. The difference in choice behavior is 
that in the starting point, especially in questions one (1) to six (6) of the choice task, 
individuals in the intervention group show a larger fraction of people choosing to wait for the 
LL choice. It could be that this is due to the overall willpower to resist the SS temptation 
decreases after the mid-point in this type of a choice-task. Being exposed to similar kind of 




The findings of this research suggest that an exogenous activation of self-control by the use of 
a simple verbal sentence inside the implementation intention structure induces people on 
average choosing more LL rewards than the control group in financial delay discounting with 
binary hypothetical choices. To my knowledge these results presents first evidence of a 
successful exogenous activation of self-control with verbal attention cues in hypothetical 
financial delay discounting. The facilitation of self-control was executed by the use of the Art 
of Measurement (AoM) –device, which included three functions: 1. Inhibition of a prepotent 
response, 2. Response time, and 3. A two-relation inverted value judgment. 
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My personal speculation about the self-control phenomena is that, although a part of the 
individual differences in delay discounting can be explained by dispositional factors (e.g. 
Gianotti et al., 2012 and Anokhin et al. 2011), it is because of lack of education about how to 
activate the reflective processes that most people fail to allocate their cognitive resources in 
an optimal way. This inability to make patient and self-controlled decisions is being 
continuously reinforced in our modern western society, because of the influence of impulsive 
signals that our sensual pattern recognition is daily exposed to in the digital environment. 
Some credit may likely be given to the way most people consume popular media. The 
evolution of the brain has probably not caught up with this increasingly high frequency signal 
environment. 
 
Successful activation of self-control is conditional on the facilitation of automatized self-
control in situations where resisting the temptation of the SS choice is of importance. Intuitive 
judgments may either fail us or bring us to a true opinion, but only the activation of reflective 
neural processes can provide consistency in the quality of our decision-making. In order to 
successfully approach decisions involving intertemporal choice one needs to be conscious of 
the potential difference in outcomes when the decision is approached impulsively contra 
reflectively. The activation of self-control is included only when executive cognitive control 
takes place, i.e. the activation of self-control processes is excluded when we act impulsively. 
It is probably because of this that impulsive decisions often lead to more random outcomes. 
 
The original inspiration behind this study came to being from, first of all, realizing the 
effectiveness of Professor Peter Gollwitzer’s implementation intentions tools in my martial 
arts training and competition. Secondly, the neurological studies on the brain activity in 
intertemporal choice provided me with scientific insights that made me guess that an 
intervention that channels attention could in theory be formulated. After finding out how little 
I know about how the brain works, I am humbly encouraged to continue learning more in this 
area of study. Thirdly, the writings of Plato have led to many personal revelations about the 
workings of the human mind, which of not least the dialogues of Socrates being of major 
influence. Socrates’ dialogues present brilliant interpretations about self-control and its 
importance for optimal decision-making. The two-relational inverted approach was also an 
idea that came to my mind by reading the dialogues. It is truly incredible that these 
observations of human decision-making behavior, consisting of situations where individuals 
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compare between tempting immediate pleasurable options and later better options, were 




How does the AoM –device and other self-control tools then help us to make a better world? 
On a general note, let us first reflect on the negative relation between delay discounting and 
intelligence that Shamosh et al. (2008) found in their study. People who had higher 
intelligence scores also were better in delaying gratification. Would it be outrageous to 
interpret the relation in a way that if we can help make people to resist the temptation of the 
immediate (SS) reward and thus be better at delaying gratification, then that by the use of 
these tools the individuals can become on average more intelligent? I believe that with today’s 
constantly improving brain-imaging technology we have an interesting opportunity to at least 
test this hypothesis and possibly even develop other tools to improve the mankind’s daily 
decision-making quality.  
 
On a more particular note, problems of self-control like tobacco consumption, obesity, drug-
use, excessive drinking, infidelity, sexually transmitted diseases result in negative 
consequences not only for the individual decision-makers, and also for their friends, family 
and the society as a whole. My intention was to come up with a decision-making tool that 
empowers the individual with autonomy over self-control. The tool works because it helps in 
overcoming the fallacies resulting from impulsive opining and instead facilitates a reflective 
and self-controlled decision-making process. This intention is distinct from commitment 
devices e.g. contractual services that are often a costly way of ‘outsourcing’ the need for self-
control. These commitment devices also exclude the individual’s utilization of situational 
rationality. Although in theory commitment devices often sound as a logical way to inhibit the 
temptation of the sooner-smaller reward, one needs to also consider related psychological 
processes, such as going public with one’s goal intentions, which has actually shown to have 
negative effects in goal attainment success (Gollwitzer et al., 2009). Scientific inquiry into 
real-world commitment device’s effects would be a highly recommended procedure before 
suggesting these type of contractual services to others. Examples of such services are stickK 
and SelfControl that have gained recognition as tools for committing oneself to a goal pursuit 
process. 
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If I draw speculate correctly about the Reimers et al. (2007 & 2009) studies, they are 
suggestive of a conclusion that exogenous self-control facilitations could in theory be 
beneficial in real life situations. An example of such a measure of self-control, that is 
consequential for its economic and societal effects, is tobacco use. It is probably needless to 
here restate the harms of tobacco consumption, when in America only the smoking of tobacco 
is attributed to approximately 400,000 annual deaths (Giovino, 2007). Fletcher and Sindelar 
(2009) found out that taxes have close to no effects on reducing smoking in people who lack 
self-control, since these people are largely unresponsive to the price of cigarettes. Instead the 
researchers suggested that other means of self-control with the intention of tobacco use 
reduction should be studied.  
 
The findings of my study would suggest that exogenous activation of self-control with tools 
like the AoM -device could be one alternative way to approach the problem. As an example, 
the individual would plan and modify the AoM –device in a following way, “If I feel the 
desire to smoke a cigarette, then I will ignore my impulsive opinion and take time to measure 
which is the worse choice … and then select the other one!” Whenever the members of our 
society learn to use such self-control tools as the AoM –device, and if even a small fraction of 
the people lacking endogenous self-control are able to resist the temptation of smoking for 
example, it would make an instant impact of increasing the life-quality of countless people. 
This can also be accomplished with minimal costs. Without further extending the speculation 
about possible benefits in other health related domains like obesity, microeconomic decisions, 
sexually transmitted diseases and drug consumption, it can perhaps be intuitively concluded 
that the implications are truly relevant.  
 
As of now I am unaware of an economic model that takes the triple nature of the neural 
processes in intertemporal choice, the intuitive, the reflective and the self-control, into 
account. Creating a model inclusive of a parameter representing an exogenous activation of 
self-control would likely be beneficial for approximating the impact of such self-control tools. 
 
Lastly, my proposal is to call the LL choice by the name “the evolutionary choice” and the SS 
choice as “the static choice”. This is, because making the LL choice promotes positive intra- 
and interpersonal growth, or results to higher overall utility than the SS choice. Often the 
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impulsive choice results in consequences that either hold the status quo or even lead to 
negative personal development trajectories. 
 
Limitations of the present study 
 
There are several shortcomings that could be improved in future research on this topic. 
Firstly, instead of self-reported response times, actual response times would be interesting to 
study which requires more sophisticated experiment materials than the survey tool that was 
used in this experiment. Also, an incentivized duplication of this study with a larger sample 
would be of interest to test if a more resourceful experiment leads to different results. A 
possible enhancement of the experimental design would be in using Sindelar’s (Yale 
Scientific, 2012) question of self-control after thy choice task, “Do you go with your gut when 
you make decisions?” instead of the WHO’s ADHD questionnaire that failed as an attempt to 
measure individual’s self-control outside the choice task environment. Also, the response rate 
to the experiment would have been possibly much higher if the experimental design of the 
choice task would have consisted of a smaller number of binary questions. This would have 
also possibly resulted to a dataset that has a smaller variation between subjects in terms of the 
fraction of LL choices which would have made the statistical analysis of the results more 
efficient. The intervention wording could also be optimized. This could be attempted by using 
a more direct goal-behavior script, such as “…measure, which is the lowest utility choice…” 
This wording would focus the attention on the concept of “utility”, instead of a more general 
value judgment that was used in the division to “better” and “worse” choices. The AoM –
device could be studied in comparison with another intervention design, possibly even a 
contraceptive treatment which attempts at making the participants in the intervention group 
more impulsive, rather than more reflective. The econometric analysis could be further 
improved by using a parametric approach to estimate the temporal discount function. Finally, 
it would be interesting to use fMRI technology to study the neural processes of decision-
makers that implement the AoM –device. 
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“It is one of the most pregnant facts of experience that we attach a less importance to future 
pleasures and pains simply because they are future... To goods which are destined to meet the 
wants of the future, we ascribe a value which is really less than the true intensity of their 
future marginal utility... Which of us has not been surprised to find that under the pressure of 
some momentary appetite, he was not able to refuse some favorite dish or cigar which the 
doctor had for— bidden——knowing perfectly that he was doing an injury to his health, 
which, calm consideration would tell him, was much more considerable than the pleasure of 
that trifling indulgence?... Anyone who knows himself, and keeps his eyes open to what is 
going on around him, will find this fact of the underestimate of future pleasures and pains 
exhibited under a thousand forms in the midst of our civilized society. Of the fact then there is 
no doubt”. 
 – Böhm-Bawerk, E., The Positive Theory of Capital translated by W. Smart (London: 
MacMillian & Co.) 1891. 
 
Judgment and Decision Making (JDM) 
“The Society for Judgment and Decision Making is an interdisciplinary academic 
organization which dedicated to the study of normative, descriptive, and prescriptive theories 
of decision. Its members include psychologists, economists, organizational researchers, 
decision analysts, and other decision researchers. The Society also publishes the journal called 
‘Judgment and Decision Making’” (www.sjdm.org). Over the past 50 years the JDM reviews 
has described different decision-making phenomena including categories such as preferences, 
beliefs, decision under risk and uncertainty, risky choices, intertemporal choice and social 
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decisions (Weber and Johnson, 2009). The following quote from the 2009 review is 
informative about their philosophy: 
Since its origins in the 1950s, judgment and decision making (JDM) research has been 
dominated by mathematical functional relationship models that were its point of departure in 
the form of normative models. This focus on economics and statistics may have led JDM 
research to underutilize the insights and methods of psychology. Aided by the recent arrival of 
neuroscience methodologies to complement behavioral research, the field has started to 
realize, however, that the brain that decides how to invest pension money and what car to buy 
is the same brain that also learns to recognize and categorize sounds and faces, resolves 
perceptual conflicts, acquires motor skills such as those used in playing tennis, and 
remembers (or fails to remember) episodic and semantic information. In this review, we make 
a strong case for the utility of this realization. –JDM, 2009 review (Weber and Johnson, 2009) 
My research process attempts to follow the philosophy of the JDM approach in striving after 
an open-minded and integrated inquiry into the subject of intertemporal choice and self-
control (for a short but informative review on the integration between economics, psychology 
and neuroscience, see Berns et al., 2007). With this I mean that I have tried to keep a 
deliberate state of mind in considering influences from cognitive psychology and 
neuroscience during the different phases of my research. Without the inspiring spirit of the 
JDM literature, I would have possibly been more restrictive in limiting my reading to 
economics literature, and quite likely missed on a lot of interesting information. 
 
Accuracy of survey reports with sensitive questions 
There is marginal evidence for misreporting being common and to a large extend situational 
when participants are answering sensitive questions that request information that is potentially 
embarrassing to report. These types of responses that are done privately on a computer are 
less prone to misreporting rather than in situations where a closer personal proximity to the 
experimenter can lead to misreporting due to an avoidance of feeling embarrassment (for a 
review, see Tourangeau & Yan, 2007). The questions in this experiment should not create any 
feelings of embarrassment, but if that would be the case then the survey format would in 
theory lead to a fewer number of misreporting than if the experiment was conducted in a 
laboratory environment. 




According to Buechel et al. (2014) students with high self-control have better performance in 
school. This seems intuitive. More interestingly, also having relations with other high self-
control individuals results in other social benefits such as having more friends and 
connections to other well performing peers. That connectedness to well performing peers in 
itself also improves performance. The aforementioned influence of peers provides important 
information about how to approach successful goal striving. Whether the information from 
peers is shared intentionally or unintentionally, good role models matter. 
 
Figure 1 from “Towards a neurobiological model of cue-induced self-
control in decision making: Relevance to addiction and obesity” 
 











Screenshots of example question, a choice task question and the SES 
questions 
 











 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .593 1 .593 5.869 .017 
Within Groups 10.702 106 .101   
Total 11.295 107    
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:   LLs of total   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model ,593a 1 ,593 5,869 ,017 
Intercept 42,815 1 42,815 424,069 ,000 
x ,593 1 ,593 5,869 ,017 
Error 10,702 106 ,101   
Total 54,109 108    
Corrected Total 11,295 107    




Dependent Variable:   LLs of total 
Parameter B Std. Error t Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Intercept ,704 ,043 16,275 ,000 ,618 ,789 
[x=0] -,148 ,061 -2,423 ,017 -,269 -,027 
[x=1] 0a . . . . . 
a. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant. 
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Choice distribution of the 16 questions in the two conditions 
LLs * x Crosstabulation 
 x Total 
0 (Base) 1 (AoM) 
LLs 
0 
Count 1 3 4 
% within x 1,9% 5,6% 3,7% 
1 
Count 1 1 2 
% within x 1,9% 1,9% 1,9% 
2 
Count 3 4 7 
% within x 5,6% 7,4% 6,5% 
3 
Count 3 0 3 
% within x 5,6% 0,0% 2,8% 
4 
Count 5 0 5 
% within x 9,3% 0,0% 4,6% 
5 
Count 4 0 4 
% within x 7,4% 0,0% 3,7% 
6 
Count 6 1 7 
% within x 11,1% 1,9% 6,5% 
7 
Count 3 0 3 
% within x 5,6% 0,0% 2,8% 
8 
Count 3 2 5 
% within x 5,6% 3,7% 4,6% 
9 
Count 2 3 5 
% within x 3,7% 5,6% 4,6% 
10 
Count 2 8 10 
% within x 3,7% 14,8% 9,3% 
11 
Count 1 3 4 
% within x 1,9% 5,6% 3,7% 
12 
Count 3 4 7 




















0 54 ,5556 ,31629 ,04304 ,4692 ,6419 ,00 1,00 
1 54 ,7037 ,31919 ,04344 ,6166 ,7908 ,00 1,00 
Total 108 ,6296 ,32489 ,03126 ,5677 ,6916 ,00 1,00 
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13 
Count 2 0 2 
% within x 3,7% 0,0% 1,9% 
14 
Count 2 3 5 
% within x 3,7% 5,6% 4,6% 
15 
Count 4 5 9 
% within x 7,4% 9,3% 8,3% 
16 
Count 9 17 26 
% within x 16,7% 31,5% 24,1% 
Total 
Count 54 54 108 




 x LLs_of_total 
x 
Pearson Correlation 1 ,229* 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,017 
N 108 108 
LLs_of_total 
Pearson Correlation ,229* 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,017  
N 108 108 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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